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The Hampton Roads region is one of the most vulnerable areas to recurrent flooding on the 
United States’ eastern coastline due to sea level rise and land subsidence.1 With an estimated $100 
billion worth of buildings, large military installations, and major ports in this area, sea level rise 
can have severely negative impacts on the region if it is not addressed.2 This paper addresses what 
authority and tools localities have to respond to these issues. 
 
 Section I will describe the legal relationships among the state government, the local 
government, and the citizens, and limitations on the powers of local governments. This Section 
will briefly summarize the Dillon Rule and take a closer look at takings claims.  
 
The General Assembly, however, has granted numerous authorities to local governments 
that can be used to address recurrent flooding.  Section II of this paper will discuss those existing 
powers and tools available to localities. Each section contains brief examples and possible 
pathways for localities to harness these existing tools to adapt to sea level rise and recurrent 
flooding.   
 
The value of a tool lies in its usefulness, or in this case, its use in carrying out good policy.  
Thus, to provide context for the policy implications of these tools, Section III examines the process 
and impact of three infrastructure adaptation policies used in areas outside of Virginia: elevation, 
relocation, and retreat.     
 
Finally, a locality’s power is not limited to action alone; local governments are uniquely 
positioned to lobby the Commonwealth for new powers, abilities, and statutory clarifications to 
address this growing challenge.  Therefore, Section IV examines potential state actions that could 











                                                 
1 See e.g., John D. Boon and Molly Mitchell, Nonlinear change in sea level observed at North American tide 
stations, 31 JOURNAL OF COASTAL RESEARCH 1295 (2015); Tal Ezer and Larry P. Atkinson, Sea Level Rise in 
Virginia–Causes, Effects and Response, 66 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF SCIENCE 8 (2015); George Van Houtven et al., 
RTI Int’l, Costs of Doing Nothing: Economic Consequences of Not Adapting to Sea Level Rise in the Hampton 
Roads Region, VA. COASTAL. POLICY CTR., 1-1 (Nov. 2016), http://law.wm.edu 
/academics/programs/jd/electives/clinics/vacoastal/reports/Costs%20of%20Doing%20Nothing%20Cover%20and%2
0Final%20Report.pdf. 




I. BACKGROUND: LIMITS ON THE AUTHORITY OF 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN VIRGINIA 
 
Although the substantial discussion of this paper will discuss the legal tools available to 
localities, the most important tool for addressing sea level rise is knowledge.  As such, this section 
provides background information regarding the legal rules that define the relationships between 
different levels of government, as well as between Virginia citizens and the government. 
 
A. The Dillon Rule 
  
An important consideration that should be remembered when analyzing local authority is 
that Virginia is a Dillon Rule state. This means that Virginia follows the Dillon Rule of statutory 
construction, a “strict construction concerning the powers of local governing bodies.”3 In other 
words, localities can only act in a way that they are expressly authorized to act by the General 
Assembly, powers necessarily or fairly implied from the express powers, and powers that are 
essential and indispensable.4 While the Dillon Rule is relatively clear for traditional local 
government responsibilities which are defined in statute, the Rule may hamper localities as they 
seek to adapt to new and unanticipated circumstances for which the Virginia statutes are silent or 
vague.5 The Virginia Constitution speaks to this by addressing powers of local government; the 
General Assembly may, through law or act, allow a locality to exercise its powers to perform a 
certain function, or even transfer and/or share services or functions with a regional government.6  
 
B. Takings Claims 
  
The Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment of the United States’ Constitution states that 
“no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Takings can be physical or 
regulatory.7 Sea level rise and recurrent flooding may increase the occurrence of both physical and 
regulatory takings. On one hand, sea level rise may make physical takings more relevant as 
localities respond to the physical encroachment of water on specific properties. On the other hand, 
localities may take a broader approach to enact regulations to address sea level rise and recurrent 
flooding, resulting in potential takings claims.  
 
                                                 
3 Tabler v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Fairfax Cty., 221 Va. 200, 202 (1980); See, Jennings v. Bd. of Supervisors of 
Northumberland Cty., 281 Va. 511, 516 (2011) (“[A] locality’s zoning powers are ‘fixed by statute and are limited 
to those conferred expressly or by necessary implication.’”) (citations omitted); Logan v. City Council of the City of 
Roanoke, 275 Va. 483, 492 (2008); Norton v. City of Danville, 268 Va. 402, 407 (2004). Further discussion of 
Virginia’s Dillon Rule jurisprudence is annexed hereto as Appendix A. 
4 See, VA. CONST. art. VII, § 3; VA. CODE Ann. § 1-248 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1401 (1997).    
5 E.g., Fairfax County, Va., Dillon Rule in Virginia, https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/government/about/dillon-
rule.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2017) (stating the Dillon Rule can constrain “innovative government responses”). 
6 See VA. CONST. art. VII, § 3. 
7 See, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
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1. Federal Case Law 
 
There are several major cases that have guided takings law in the United States and define 
what constitutes a physical or regulatory taking.8 Even a minor physical intrusion can be found to 
be an unconstitutional taking of property.9 Furthermore, a taking can be found even if it is 
temporary; in Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, the Supreme Court held that 
recurrent flooding caused by government action, “even if of finite duration, [is] not categorically 
exempt from Takings Clause liability.”10 The Court noted that various factors are considered 
including “time[,] . . . the degree to which the invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of 
authorized government action[,] . . . the character of the land at issue[,] and the owners reasonable 
investment-backed expectations[, and] . . . [s]everity of the interference.”11   
 
 In summary, a physical taking can occur when the intrusion is minor, or even when the 
intrusion is temporary. This is particularly relevant to the issue of sea level rise. Floods are 
temporary deprivations; when the waters recede, landowners still maintain their control of the 
flooded property.  If one is lucky, a flood may also only cause minor damage. Yet, both minor and 
temporary intrusions are not excluded from potential takings claims when government action was 
a causal factor.   
    
 Analysis can become more complicated when dealing with regulatory takings. In 
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, the Supreme Court held that “while property may be regulated to a 
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”12 In Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, the Supreme Court found a taking occurred when South Carolina enacted a law that in 
effect barred the landowner from building any habitable structures on his two beachfront lots.13 
The Supreme Court held that a taking occurs when a regulation denies the owner all economically 
viable use of the land.14 However, a state may avoid compensation if it shows that the land 
deprivation was done to prevent a nuisance or another use forbidden by the state’s existing law.15 
For situations where the regulatory action does not deny all economically viable use, the Supreme 
Court, in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, “identified several factors that have 
particular significance[,]” including “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant[,] . 
. . the extent to which the regulation has interfered with investment-backed expectations[, and] . . 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003; Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). 
9 The size of the intrusion necessary to cause an unconstitutional taking was addressed by Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., which involved a cable company acting pursuant to state law to install a cable on the side 
of an apartment building to provide television services to the tenants. The Supreme Court found that an 
unconstitutional taking had occurred, noting, “when the ‘character of the governmental action’ is a 
permanent physical occupation of property, [the United States Supreme Court] uniformly [has] found a taking to the 
extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only 
minimal economic impact on the owner.” (citation omitted). 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982). 
10 568 U.S. 23, 27 (2012). 
11 Id. at 39 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
12 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
13 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019-20. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 1028-31. 
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. the character of the governmental action.”16 These factors are considered with respect to the 
“parcel as a whole[.]”17 
 
 Another type of takings case deals with exactions. Exactions are conditions or 
compensation requirements imposed on developers to mitigate the impacts of their development. 
In Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n., the Supreme Court found a taking where the California Coastal 
Commission conditioned its approval for the Nollans to rebuild their house on granting a public 
easement across their beachfront property.18 The Court held that a land-use regulation does not 
effect a taking if it “substantially advances legitimate state interests”19 and that there must be an 
“essential nexus” between the state interest and government action.20 The exactions analysis was 
expanded in Dolan v. City of Tigard where the petitioner challenged the conditioning of approval 
of her permit to redevelop her business on the dedication of some of her land for a greenway.21 
The Court adopted a “rough proportionality” test,22 and held that a taking occurred because there 
was not enough of a reasonable relation between the development of a greenway and the 
government’s interest in reducing traffic from the redeveloped business.23 Another more recent 
case dealing with exactions that may be troubling to localities is Koontz v. St. Johns River Water 
Mgmt. Dist., where the Court found that denial of a land use permit unless the plaintiff agreed to a 
monetary exaction (not a direct taking of real property) constituted a taking under Nollan and 
Dolan analysis.24 The Court said “the government’s demand for property from a land-use permit 
applicant must satisfy the requirements of Nollan and Dolan even when the government denies the 
permit and even when its demand is for money.”25  
 
 Another case of significance to local governments is Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, in which 
a landowner acquired beachfront property with the intention of filling and developing it.26  The 
plaintiff’s plans were rejected as they violated regulations which predated plaintiff’s ownership of 
the property.27  The Supreme Court determined that Palazzolo’s takings claim was not barred by 
acquiring the property after the enactment of the restrictive regulation.28   Ultimately, the Court 
determined Palazzolo did not experience a taking, as there were still viable economic uses of his 
property.29  However, the fact that Palazzolo could successfully bring a taking claim for property 
acquired after the challenged regulation was enacted is noteworthy for governments to heed.   
 
                                                 
16 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
17 Id. at 131. 
18 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987). 
19 Id. at 834. 
20 Id. at 836-37. 
21 512 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1994). 
22 Id. at 391. 
23 Id. at 391-96. 
24 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591 (2013). 
25 Id. at 2603. 
26 533 U.S. 606, 611 (2001).   
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 627-28. 
29 Id. at 616. 
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 More recently, in Murr v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court considered a takings claim 
regarding properties along the St. Croix River, which is protected under federal, state, and local 
law. In Murr, claimants brought a takings claim regarding state and local regulations associated 
with their common ownership of two adjacent lots, Lot E and Lot F, respectively.30  The two lots, 
when combined, constituted 0.98 buildable acres of land.31  Under Wisconsin state law, and a 
parallel local ordinance, the buildable area of a parcel must be greater than one acre in order for it 
to be sold or developed as separate lots.32  These regulations contained a grandfather clause to 
allow development of smaller lots in existence at the time of the regulation, January 1, 1976.33  
However, the grandfather clause included a merger provision that extinguished the clause when 
adjacent lots were came under common ownership, i.e., the adjacent lots are treated as one lot.34 
Thus, when Lot E and Lot F came under common ownership, the claimants lost the ability to 
develop them as separate lots.35  Claimants argued that their inability to sell Lot E as a result of 
the state and local regulations constituted a government taking because it deprived them of the use 
of Lot E.36 Plaintiffs argued that the lot lines defined the property in question under the taking 
claim. Conversely, Wisconsin argued that the taking analysis should be applied to the contiguous 
lots as a whole, because that is how the property was defined under state law.37  The Supreme 
Court ruled that the “subject property” of any takings claim should be defined by a fact specific 
inquiry which considers 1) the treatment of the land under state and local law, 2) the physical 
characteristics of the land, and 3) the potential value of the regulated land, in order to determine 
what an objective landowner should expect.38 When applying this test in this situation, the 
Supreme Court determined that the Murrs’ property should be considered as one property.39 As 
such, the regulations did not constitute a taking.40   
 
Murr may create greater ambiguity for takings claims. Under Lucas, denying a landowner 
all economically viable use of a land constitutes a taking. And, under Penn Central, when all 
economically viable use has not been denied, several factors are considered to determine whether 
the regulatory impact on the parcel as a whole resulted in a taking. Murr introduces uncertainty 
with respect to how the “parcel as a whole” is determined. As the fact-specific inquiry utilized in 
Murr can only be made by a court, Murr may lead to greater uncertainty surrounding certain 





                                                 













2. Virginia Case Law 
 
While the Supreme Court provides guidance for takings claims under the federal 
constitution, the laws governing takings are state-specific when local government actions are 
challenged under state laws or constitutions. The Virginia Constitution provides that the General 
Assembly shall pass no laws that result in private property being damaged or taken unless 1) it is 
for public use, 2) there is just compensation, and 3) no more property is taken than is necessary to 
achieve the public use.41 There are several Virginia cases that may be helpful when addressing 
what authority localities have to address sea level rise. 
 
 One is 3232 Page Avenue Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n v. City of Virginia Beach where the 
Virginia Supreme Court examined “whether a condemnor may, in an eminent domain proceeding, 
alternatively assert ownership rights in the condemned property,” and whether there was an 
implied dedication of the contested property.42 To combat severe erosion of Cape Henry Beach, 
the City of Virginia Beach wanted to replenish the beach with additional sand.43  Thus, they sought 
easements from property owners along the beach to allow the City entry for the purpose of 
pumping sand onto the beach.44 The Condominium Association rejected the City’s offer to 
purchase a beach easement so the City filed a “Petition for Condemnation to Confirm Public 
Easements,” which was subsequently challenged by the Association.45 The Court stated that 
statutes addressing eminent domain power must be strictly construed and localities must fully 
comply with them.46 The Court noted that it considers “the language of each statute at issue to 
determine the General Assembly's intent from the plain and natural meaning of the words used. 
When the language of a statute is unambiguous, courts are bound by the plain meaning of that 
language.”47 The Court found in favor of the City on this point because they were not trying to 
condemn property they already owned, but rather the land for the easements, which were in 
dispute.48 The Court also held that there was an implied dedication to the City where “the public 
has used the entirety of Cape Henry Beach since 1926, the City has patrolled and maintained the 
property for over thirty years, and the Condo Association never objected to the City's exercise of 
dominion and control.”49 
 
 Lynnhaven Dunes Condo. Ass’n v. City of Virgina. Beach, a companion case to 3232 Page 
Avenue Condominium, deals with substantially the same facts, but offers a good discussion about 
riparian rights.50 The Association argued that the beach replenishment project had allowed the 
creation of an artificial strip of land that had severed its connection to the Chesapeake Bay, and 
that the placement of sand on Cape Henry Beach for the project was not necessary for navigation 
                                                 
41 See VA. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
42 735 S.E.2d. 672, 672 (Va. 2012). 
43 Id. a 672. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 675. 
46 Id.. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 677-78. 
50 733 S.E.2d 911 (Va. 2012). 
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of the Lynnhaven Inlet.51 The Court noted that one of the benefits for a riparian landowner is the 
right to accretions.52 However, while the landowner automatically takes title to dry land added 
through accretion, dry land created by avulsion will remain with the owner of the seabed, which 
is generally the state.53 The Court also said that a riparian owner’s property rights are “subordinate 
to the improvement of navigation”, meaning there is no taking.54 In this case, dredging improved 
the navigation of the Lynnhaven Inlet, although the necessity of the sand placement on Cape Henry 
Beach was questioned.55 
 
A landmark Virginia takings case dealt with flooding in Fairfax County, Virginia. In 
Livingston v. VDOT, homeowners sued Fairfax County and the Virginia Department of 
Transportation after their homes were flooded following a severe storm in 2006.56 The storm 
caused the depth of a local stream, Cameron Run, to rise from two feet to fourteen feet.57 The 
plaintiffs alleged that the flooding was caused by the acts or omissions of the County and VDOT.58 
They argued that the flooding would not have occurred if the path of Cameron Run had not been 
altered by development in the floodplain and incorporated into the drainage system for the Beltway 
and that VDOT’s failure to dredge and maintain the channel further exacerbated the problem.59 
The Court held in favor of the plaintiffs, saying that just compensation is not limited only to 
multiple occurrences of flooding, and that “a single occurrence of flooding can support an inverse 
condemnation claim.”60 The Court further stated that the government’s constitutional obligation 
to pay just compensation is not limited to damages caused by “affirmative and purposeful acts,” 
but also includes the government’s failure to act.61 The Court noted, “When the government 
constructs a public improvement, it does not thereby become an insurer in perpetuity against flood 
damage to neighboring property.”62 A locality is responsible when the government’s operation of 
that public improvement causes damage.63 This outcome is worrisome for localities that are now 
concerned that they too will be held responsible for the lack of maintenance of stormwater drainage 
systems, and not just ones that they have constructed on public lands; localities also hold drainage 
easements for subdivisions that transferred automatically upon dedication of the subdivision plat.  
Localities may not even be aware of all of the drainage easements they hold. Furthermore, the 
Virginia Stormwater Management Act requires perpetual maintenance of stormwater BMPs,64 
which imposes further liability on localities. 
 
                                                 
51 Id. at 912-13. 




56 726 S.E.2d 264, 267 (Va. 2012). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 268. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 274. 
62 Id. at 276. 
63 Id. 
64 VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:27(E)(2) (2017). 
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 Another Virginia case, Collett v. City of Norfolk, addressed potential takings claims for 
flooding of private property.65  In Collett, the homeowner alleged that the City took her property 
when it issued a fill permit to the adjoining property owners and was not effectively enforcing the 
City Code.66 After the adjoining land owners were awarded the permit they did not install a 
retaining wall as required by the permit, and Collett’s land subsequently flooded.67 The City sent 
multiple letters to the adjoining property owners to let them know they were in violation.68 The 
adjoining owners did eventually install a berm, but Collett claimed it was inadequate and led to 
damage to her property.69 The Court distinguished Livingston, which concerned “governmental 
authorities making choices not to maintain an instrumentality in their control created to adequately 
deal with excess storm water.”70 The Court held this was not the case in Collett because the City 
did not own the adjoining property, did not complete construction or alteration to that property, 
and that property was used for completely private purposes.71 Additionally, the City’s stormwater 
disposal system was not a contributing factor so it is further distinguished from Livingston.72 This 
case also highlights the difference between the courts’ treatment of flooding due to a locality’s 
failure to maintain its infrastructure and due to a locality’s failure to enforce its codes. 
 
These cases indicate that Virginia courts will likely frown on government actions 1) 
dubiously related to the public interest,73 2) which encroach unnecessarily on private property 
rights,74 and 3) which exacerbate flooding onto private property.75  In the broadest and most 
general of terms, the more deliberate, and the more unnecessary a government action is, the greater 
the chance that localities may face scrutiny under Virginia takings analysis.  In the wake of 
Livingston, government actors may face scrutiny when creating infrastructure without a plan to 
maintain it, or a plan to mitigate and manage any flooding it creates.   
 
C. Outside Jurisdictions 
  
Since takings analyses are based in federal constitutional principles and Virginia law is still 
evolving concerning government liability in the sea level rise context, Virginia courts may be able 
to draw parallels, or borrow concepts from other states. The decisions are ambiguously applicative 
though because these cases are usually state-specific based on a state’s constitution or property 
law. 
 
In Litz, a recent case from Maryland, the landowner lost her campground to foreclosure 
after her lake (“Lake Bonnie”) was allegedly polluted by run-off from a failed septic system 
                                                 
65 85 Va. Cir. 258 (2012). 






72 Id. at 260-61. 
73 See 3232 Page Avenue Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n, 735 S.E.2d 672.  
74 See Lynnhaven Dunes Condo. Ass’n, 733 S.E.2d at 915-918. 
75 See Livingston, 726 S.E.2d at 267. 
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serving homes and businesses in that area.76  The individual septic systems of area residents began 
to fail over time and overflowed into the two streams feeding the lake, causing contamination.77 
The local Health Department issued safety warnings and the Maryland Department of the 
Environment (“MDE”) issued a consent order outlining remedial measures for the contamination, 
but failed to enforce it.78 
 
 Litz alleged that she had a cause of action for inverse condemnation because of MDE’s 
failure to address the pollution and sewage problems, which led to the devaluation and loss of her 
property.79 In Maryland, an inverse condemnation claim may arise when the government denies 
access to property, regulatory actions effectively take away economically viable use of property, 
physical invasions have occurred, or there is a credible and prolonged threat of condemnation that 
diminishes values or forces the property owner to sell.80 However, Litz’s claims did not necessarily 
fit into these categories because they focused on the inaction of MDE, and because Maryland law 
did not directly address that issue, the Court looked elsewhere for persuasive cases.81 
 
 One case the Court looked at was Jordan v. St. John’s County from Florida.82 In that case, 
a Florida District Court found a cognizable claim where the County failed in its duty to maintain 
and repair an old county road, which effectively abandoned it and deprived property owners of 
access without just compensation.83 The road, which faced problems with storm damage and 
erosion, was the only access to a subdivision located on a barrier island.84 The Court held that 
“governmental inaction — in the face of an affirmative duty to act — can support a claim for 
inverse condemnation.”85 Persuaded by Jordan and other cases, the Maryland Court held that Litz 
adequately stated a claim for inverse condemnation.86 The Court reasoned that even though sewage 
was flowing from failed septic systems of private citizens, and there were questions as to which 
agencies had legal duties, “it is not frivolous to hypothesize that state, county, and municipal 
agencies may have duties to step in to protect the public health.”87 
 
 Fromm, a Wisconsin case, stands in contrast to Litz. In Fromm, property owners filed an 
inverse condemnation claim against the Village of Lake Delton for flooding and erosion damage 
on their land.88 The Village acquired a dam in 1994 and made no changes to it.89 After unusually 
heavy rain, water overflowed from the dam, causing severe damage damage to the neighboring 
                                                 
76 Litz v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, 131 A.3d 923, 925 (2016). 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 926-27. 
79 Id. at 929. 
80 Id. at 931. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 932. 
83 Jordan v. St. Johns Cty., 63 So. 3d 835, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
84 Id. at 836-37. 
85 Id. at 839. 
86 Litz, 131 A.3d at 934.  
87 Id. at 933-34.  
88 Fromm v. Vill. of Lake Delton, 847 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Wis. Ct. App. 2014).  
89 Id.  
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properties.90 The Village moved for summary judgment because it had not engaged in any action 
that would support a takings claim and the Court agreed, holding that a valid takings claim must 
“include allegations of affirmative government action.”91 Additionally, the Court stated that under 
the state constitution government action is a prerequisite for a taking, and the Court is not “free to 
disregard this plainly stated rule and search for inaction that might be considered to be the 
functional equivalent of action, as might be at issue for example in the negligence context.”92 
 
 In Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, New Jersey initiated a series of flooding  
infrastructure projects following Hurricane Sandy.93 The Borough exercised its power of eminent 
domain to construct a system of dunes along the beach and across the Karens’ property to protect 
coastal properties.94 The question in this case was not whether the Karans were entitled to just 
compensation, but rather how that just compensation was to be calculated when the project may 
lessen part of the property value while also raising part of the property value.95 The Karans were 
able to introduce evidence that their obstructed view lowered the property value, but the trial court 
had not allowed the Borough to introduce evidence that it actually raised the value of the home by 
protecting it from storms.96 The Court held that the information should have been considered, and 
that just compensation for a partial taking of property must be based on: 
 
a consideration of all relevant, reasonably calculable, and non-conjectural factors 
that either decrease or increase the value of the remaining property. In a partial-
takings case, homeowners are entitled to the fair market value of their loss… To 
calculate that loss, courts must look to the difference between the fair market value 
of the property before the partial taking and after the taking.97 
 
This is a helpful case to keep in mind as localities adapt because the logic is likely applicable to 
takings claims in Virginia.  Property value is a present measurement that already incorporates 
future conditions of the land inherently.  Thus, the measure of damages for any taking is simply 
the difference between the prior market value, and the subsequent market value after government 
action.  Protecting the land from future flooding is already taken into consideration in that property 
value change.  
 
                                                 
90 Id. at 848. 
91 Id. at 852. 
92 Id. at 853.  Takings claims share many principles with negligence liability torts.  See, Hansen v. United States, 65 
Fed. Cl. 76, 80 (2005) (stating“there is no clear cut distinction between torts and takings. The best that can be said is 
that not all torts are takings, but that all takings by physical invasion have their origin in tort law and are types of 
governmental nuisances or, at times, trespasses.”).  However there are some notable differences; while taking claims 
are based on constitutional authority, see, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302, 306 (2002), tort liability can be modified by statues such as those defining the bounds of sovereign 
immunity, see, Sandra B. Zellmer, Takings, Torts, and Background Principles, 52 Wake Forest L. Rev. 193, 202 
(2017). 
93 Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 526 (N.J. 2013).  
94 Id. at 526. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 526-27. 
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In St. Bernard Parish v. United States, plaintiffs living in the Ninth Ward of New Orleans 
during Hurricane Katrina alleged that the United States Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) had 
engaged in a taking by constructing but not maintaining a 76-mile long navigational channel that 
enhanced and contributed to the severe damage to the Ninth Ward during the hurricane. 98 The 
court concluded that the USACE, in failing to maintain its construction project, had engaged in a 
temporary taking because it had 1) caused, 2) foreseeably increased flooding which 3) 
substantially, 4) deprived property owners of their property interests under state law, 5) in contrast 
to their reasonable-investment backed expectations.99  This, notably, presents similar themes to 
Livingston v. VDOT.  In both cases, though, it is worth noting that the government has not been 
made liable for all failing infrastructure; the taking is found in the government actions and 
subsequent inactions, in this case inadequate maintenance, that caused the temporary flooding.100  
 
Although these cases are not explicitly precedential to Virginia courts, the relative 
homogeneity of takings law creates the possibility that the logic of these cases will be adopted by 
other jurisdictions.  Localities should remain aware of the principles behind these rulings to help 
guide their actions away from potential takings claims. 
 
II. EXISTING TOOLS 
 
The General Assembly has granted numerous authorities to local governments that can be 
used to address recurrent flooding. This Section will explain those existing tools, provide examples 
of their use, and discuss possible pathways for localities to harness these existing tools to adapt to 
sea level rise and recurrent flooding.   
 
A. Planning and Regulatory Options 
 
1. Comprehensive Plan  
 
The Tool: Every governing body is required to adopt a comprehensive plan, developed by 
the local planning commission, for the territory under its jurisdiction that guides the development 
of that territory which “will, in accordance with present and probable future needs and resources, 
best promote the health, safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity and general welfare of the 
inhabitants, including the elderly and persons with disabilities.”101 The comprehensive plans for 
localities within Tidewater Virginia102 shall include coastal resource management guidance as 
                                                 
98 St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687 (2015).  
99 See generally, id. 
100 See id; Livingston, 726 S.E.2d 264. 
101 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2223 (2014). 
102 See VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:68 (2017) (defining “Tidewater Virginia” as “The Counties of Accomack, 
Arlington, Caroline, Charles City, Chesterfield, Essex, Fairfax, Gloucester, Hanover, Henrico, Isle of Wight, James 
City, King and Queen, King George, King William, Lancaster, Mathews, Middlesex, New Kent, Northampton, 
Northumberland, Prince George, Prince William, Richmond, Spotsylvania, Stafford, Surry, Westmoreland, and 
York, and the Cities of Alexandria, Chesapeake, Colonial Heights, Fairfax, Falls Church, Fredericksburg, Hampton, 




developed by the Virginia Institute of Marine Science (“VIMS”), including studies on topics such 
as shoreline erosion.103 Additionally, any locality included in the Hampton Roads Planning District 
Commission must incorporate strategies for combating projected relative sea level rise and 
recurrent flooding into their comprehensive plans.104 
 
 How to Use It: Comprehensive planning is a distinct process from lawmaking, because 
these plans are not enforceable; taking actions counter to the plan are not per se barred. However, 
comprehensive plans may serve several functions in the pursuit of coastal adaptation to sea level 
rise.   
 
For example, comprehensive plans are a method for localities to receive Community Rating 
System (CRS) credits under the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) National 
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The CRS Coordinator’s Manual (the “Manual”) 105 is an 
excellent resource to review when a locality seeks to earn more CRS credits and lower their 
constituents’ flood insurance rates. The Manual contains a variety of enumerated activities that a 
locality can undertake to earn CRS credit points by modifying the comprehensive plan. These 
credits reduce flood insurance costs for those using the NFIP. Under Open Space Preservation 
(Activity 420), Open Space Incentives (Element 422.f) in the Manual, communities can receive 
“[u]p to 250 points for local requirements and incentives that keep flood-prone portions of new 
development open”106 including 10 points “if the community’s land use plan recommends open 
space use or low-density development of flood-prone areas.”107 Under Floodplain Management 
Planning (Activity 510), Floodplain Management Planning (Element 512.a), localities may receive 
up to “382 points for a communitywide floodplain management plan that follows a 10-step 
planning process[.]”108 Under the same Activity, Natural Floodplain Functions Plan (Element 
512.c), they can receive up to “100 points for adopting plans that protect one or more natural 
functions within the community’s Special Flood Hazard Area.”109  
 
Comprehensive plans also provide a process to establish and disseminate the long-term 
plans of a locality in a publicly digestible manner. For example, plaNorfolk 2030, Norfolk’s 
comprehensive plan, states the City’s vision for its future and then expands on different elements 
to broadly outline actions to guide the City toward achievement of that vision.110 plaNorfolk 2030 
integrates strategies related to sea level rise and recurrent flooding in multiple portions of the plan. 
For example, Chapter 6 of the plan, entitled Promoting Environmental Sustainability, identifies 
                                                 
103 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2223.2 (2011); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2-1100 (2011) (explaining the duties of 
VIMS in conducting research). 
104 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2223.3 (2015). 
105 See, Federal Emergency Management Agency, OMB No. 1660-0022, National Flood Insurance Program 
Community Rating System Coordinator’s Manual, (2017), [hereinafter CRS Manual], https://www.fema.gov/media-
library-data/1493905477815-
d794671adeed5beab6a6304d8ba0b207/633300_2017_CRS_Coordinators_Manual_508.pdf.  
106 Id. at 420-1. 
107 Id. at 420-25. 
108 Id. at 510-1, -4 to -29. 
109 Id. at 510-1, -35 to -36. 
110 City of Norfolk, The General Plan of the City of Norfolk: plaNorfolk 2030 (Adopted March 2013, revised August 
2017). (The vision statement is on p. 1-3.) https://www.norfolk.gov/DocumentCenter/View/2483.  
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“prepar[ation] for the consequences of natural hazards”111 as one of the chapter’s key issues, or 
goals to address. Actions associated with achievement of this goal include, among others, 
considering potential impacts of sea level rise in development and budget decisions, revising 
development regulations to address potential sea level rise impacts, continuing the use of projects 
such as living shorelines to provide resilience to sea level rise, and determining appropriate 
strategies to mitigate flooding impacts to existing flood-prone structures.112 Ultimately, the 
comprehensive plan is an effective communication tool that can establish priorities for a 
community that extend beyond a single administration.  
 
The City of Norfolk created a longer-term visioning document called Vision 2100,113 
noting that the 20-year timeframe of the comprehensive plan “limits [the plan’s] potential for 
inspiring bold change[.]”114 In Vision 2100, Norfolk planned its neighborhood priorities well into 
the future. The plan includes four categories of neighborhoods, their locations, and the zoning 
priorities for each.   
 
2. Hazard Mitigation Plan  
 
The Tool: The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) requires that localities, 
and other entities, develop and adopt hazard mitigation plans (HMPs) to receive certain types of 
“non-emergency disaster” assistance.115 HMPs identify risks and vulnerabilities associated with 
natural disasters, and put forth long-term strategies for protecting people and property from hazard 
events.116 In general, the purposes of a HMP are to: 
 
● “protect life and property by reducing the potential for future damages and 
economic losses that result from natural hazards;  
● qualify for additional grant funding, in both the pre-disaster and post-disaster 
environment;   
● speed recovery and redevelopment following future disasters;  
● integrate existing flood mitigation documents;  
● demonstrate a firm local commitment to hazard mitigation principles; and  
● comply with state and federal legislative requirements tied to local hazard 
mitigation planning.”117 
 
How to Use It: Development of a HMP enables a locality to determine a vision, guiding 
principles, and specific actions to reduce its vulnerabilities to current and future hazards. These 
                                                 
111 Id. at 6-3 and -15. 
112 Id. at 6-15 to -16. 
113 See CITY OF NORFOLK, NORFOLK VISION 2100 (2016), https://www.norfolk.gov/DocumentCenter/View/27768.  
114 Id. at 2. 
115 HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN REQUIREMENT, https://www.fema.gov/hazard-mitigation-plan-requirement (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2017). 
116 HAZARD MITIGATION PLANNING, https://www.fema.gov/hazard-mitigation-planning (last visited Nov. 19, 2017). 





specific actions, called mitigation actions, are items identified as “effective measures to reduce 
hazard risk.”118 The HMP includes certain data for each mitigation action, including its site and 
location, cost benefit, what hazard it addresses, what goal it addresses, level of priority, estimated 
cost, potential funding sources, lead agency or department, and implementation schedule.119 
During the development and adoption of its HMP, a locality could identify mitigation actions to 
address issues of sea level rise and recurrent flooding.  
 
3. Zoning Ordinance 
 
The Tool: A locality can classify, by ordinance, the territory within its jurisdiction into 
districts of any number, shape, or size it deems to be best suited to carry out its purposes of 
regulating, restricting, permitting, prohibiting, and determining different land uses; the character 
and construction of structures within the jurisdiction; the area of land, water, and air to be occupied; 
and the excavation of natural resources. The purpose of zoning ordinances are of particular interest 
for sea level rise issues. The general purpose of zoning ordinances is to promote the health, safety, 
or general welfare of the public, and they shall be designed to, among other things, provide for 
safety from flood and other dangers; to facilitate proper flood protections; to protect against the 
loss of life, health, or property from flooding or impounding structure failure; to provide for the 
preservation of agricultural and forestal lands and other lands of significance for the protection of 
the natural environment; and to provide reasonable protection against encroachment of 
development upon military installations. Further, zoning ordinances should take into reasonable 
consideration: 
 
the existing use and character of property, the comprehensive plan, the suitability 
of property for various uses, the trends of growth or change, the current and future 
requirements of the community as to land for various purposes as determined by 
population and economic studies and other studies, . . . the conservation of natural 
resources, the preservation of flood plains, the protection of life and property from 
impounding structure failures, the preservation of agricultural and forestal land, the 
conservation of properties and their values and the encouragement of the most 
appropriate use of land throughout the locality.  
 
Localities are also able to amend regulations, district boundaries, or classifications of property 
whenever public necessity, convenience, general welfare, or good zoning practice requires it.   
 
Virginia Code recognizes that there are times when these traditional zoning methods may 
be inadequate, and provides localities with conditional zoning authority120 to implement “a more 
flexible and adaptable zoning method.”121 Additionally, the Code provides for the imposition of 
                                                 
118 Id. at 7:10. 
119 Id. at 7:11.  
120 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2297 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2298 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2303 
(2008). 
121 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2296 (1997).  
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overlay districts to address specific situations and characteristics. For example, localities may 
establish airport safety overlay districts122 and mountain ridge construction overlay districts.123 
 
How to Use It: Downzoning: The most direct use of the zoning power to address the effects 
of sea level rise and recurrent flooding is to restrict coastal areas to more resilient uses, and/or 
gradually reduce the intensity of development in flood-prone areas. This limitation on development 
is known as “downzoning.”124 As mentioned above in the description of zoning authority, the 
Virginia Code requires localities to consider when drafting zoning ordinances “the current and 
future requirements of the community as to land for various purposes as determined by population 
and economic studies and other studies, . . . the conservation of natural resources, [and] the 
preservation of flood plains”,125 which could potentially include future flooding. A review of case 
law found no case that questioned whether future sea level rise and flooding were legitimate bases 
for zoning decisions under this statute. Ultimately, any decision to zone for anticipated flooding 
must be based on some concrete evidence, or the zoning decision may run the risk of “arbitrarily 
or capriciously depriv[ing] a person of the legitimate use of his or her property,” which is forbidden 
in Virginia.126 To circumvent this ambiguity, localities may enter into a voluntary downzoning 
agreement with landowners in exchange for tax credits under Virginia Code § 15.2-2286(11).127      
 
Downzoning, however, limits the future uses and development of land, and thus can lower 
property values and give rise to legal challenges if the ordinance is too specific to certain 
properties.128 Though restricting property uses and development is generally undesirable, there are 
situations in which downzoning may actually improve some property values. For example, if a 
locality were to create a requirement for a larger vegetative buffer on coastal lands, the properties 
nearby might experience reduced flooding and remain usable for a longer period. Localities can 
perform specific evaluations of flood-prone properties to determine if downzoning may be useful. 
It is worth noting that this initial assessment can be tackled through comprehensive planning.  
 
Upzoning: Conversely, “upzoning” is the process of increasing potential development in 
an area. Coastal localities could revitalize their waterfront areas by upzoning, with specific 
guidelines for developers to mitigate flooding. For example, New York City has begun such a 
process with hundreds of stakeholders to protect Brooklyn from flooding.129 Depending on the 
                                                 
122 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2294 (1997). 
123 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2295.1 (2013). 
124 See BARB MARMET, VA. COASTAL POLICY CTR., USING ZONING TOOLS TO ADAPT TO SEA LEVEL RISE 2 (2013), 
https://law.wm.edu/academics 
/programs/jd/electives/clinics/vacoastal/documents/march2014reports/zoningtools.pdf.  
125 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2284, (2008). 
126 The Virginia Constitution states that “no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law.” Va. Const. art. 1, § 11; see GREG KAMPTNER, ALBEMARLE COUNTY LAND USE LAW HANDBOOK 6-
1, 6-4 (2017).  
127 VA. CODE ANN. §15.2-2286(11) (2017). 
128 The more targeted a zoning ordinance, the more susceptible it could be to legal challenges.  See Bd. of 
Supervisors of Fairfax Cty., 202 S.E.2d 889, 893-94 (Va. 1974) (ruling against “piecemeal” zoning: ordinances 
which target specific properties far more than areas of properties); see also MARMET, supra note 124.  




conditions of an area, localities could upzone coastal areas for commercial development, but 
require the construction of flood walls and raised boardwalks to protect the developed land from 
further flood damage.130 Developers may be willing to pay this initial cost in order to densely 
develop and protect their valuable coastal property.131 However, for such a policy to be effective, 
localities would need to make upzoning sufficiently desirable and profitable to developers to build 
this infrastructure while improving the property. This could also create new challenges, such as 
changing the characteristics of existing neighborhoods, increasing the need for resilient 
transportation and wastewater infrastructure in these areas, or even curbing public access to the 
waterfront, which could lead to backlash from residents. Each locality must weigh the specific 
costs and benefits before pulling development to their coasts.   
 
Conditional Zoning and Overlay Districts: Localities also can utilize their authority to 
implement more flexible and adaptable zoning methods. For example, during the rezoning process 
for a property subject to recurrent flooding or sea level rise, localities could work with the property 
owner to develop additional zoning conditions specific to that property. On a larger scale, localities 
may create a floodplain overlay district as a means of imposing supplemental regulations or 
standards in areas prone to flooding.132  
 
CRS Credits: Zoning is also useful for earning CRS credits. For example, under Open 
Space Preservation (Activity 420), Low-density zoning (Element 422.g) “[u]p to 600 points [are 
available] for zoning districts that require lot sizes of 5 acres or larger.”133 
 
Due to the law surrounding takings claims,134 it is important that localities enact zoning 
ordinances carefully to avoid substantially depriving landowners of the expected economic benefit 
of their property. Generally, the less restrictive the regulation,135 and the broader the public need 
for the regulation,136 the less likely a locality will face a successful taking claim.  Localities should 
also pursue broad public needs when imposing zoning ordinances, to avoid “spot-zoning” in which 
“the purpose of a zoning ordinance or rezoning amendment is solely to serve the private interests 
of one or more landowners, rather than to further a locality's welfare as part of an overall zoning 
plan that may include a concurrent benefit to private interests.”137      
 
                                                 
130 E.g., id. 
131 But see Virginia Code § 15.2-2303.4(C) (2016) (deeming proffers “unreasonable unless it addresses an impact 
that is specifically attributable to a proposed new residential development or other new residential use applied for” 
and noting additional requirements related to offsite proffers). 
132 See, e.g., Norfolk City Code § 11-3 (2009).  
133 CRS Manual, supra note 105, at 420-1.  
134 Supra Section I. 
135 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (ruling that a taking occurs when a landowner is 
deprived of all reasonably anticipated economic use of the land, not just a portion of it). 
136 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n., 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (ruling there is no regulatory taking when a locality’s 
action “substantially advances a legitimate state interest”). 
137 Riverview Farm Assocs. Virginia Gen. P'ship v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Charles City Cty., 259 Va. 419, 429, 528 S.E.2d 
99, 105 (2000). 
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4. Subdivision Ordinance 
 
The Tool: “The governing body of every locality shall adopt an ordinance to assure the 
orderly subdivision of land and its development.”138 Virginia Code §§ 15.2-2241 and -2242 spell 
out mandatory and optional provisions to be included within a local subdivision ordinance. Sea 
level rise and recurrent flooding issues may be addressed in the mandatory provisions of a 
subdivision ordinance.  For example, an ordinance must apply to or provide “[f]or adequate 
provisions for drainage and flood control, for adequate provisions related to the failure of 
impounding structures and impacts within dam break inundation zones, and other public 
purposes,”139 and “[f]or the extent to which and the manner in which streets shall be graded, 
graveled or otherwise improved and water and storm and sanitary sewer and other public utilities 
or other community facilities are to be installed.”140 Additionally, sea level rise may be addressed 
in the optional provisions of a subdivision ordinance. For example, an ordinance may include 
“[p]rovisions for clustering of single-family dwellings and preservation of open space 
developments[.]”141 
 
How to Use It: These provisions authorize localities to adopt subdivision ordinances to 
provide for adequate drainage and flood control, street grading and improvement, public utility 
installation, and open space preservation - which may enable them to use subdivision ordinances 
to adapt to the anticipated impacts of climate change. Although there are no Virginia cases that 
interpret a locality’s subdivision authority with respect to addressing future conditions due to sea 
level rise, localities are constrained by the Dillon Rule. For example, in 1999 the Virginia Supreme 
Court found that Augusta County’s subdivision included two provisions beyond the County’s 
authority. The Court found that because these provisions could not be found within the locality’s 
authority given by Virginia Code §§ 15.2-2241 and -2242, that the provisions were not valid 
subdivision regulations.142 
 
Further, subdivision ordinances are also reviewed as a part of the NFIP. The minimum 
standards that a community must meet depends upon the what data the Federal Insurance 
Administrator furnishes to the community.143 For example, if “the Federal Insurance Administrator 
has designated areas of special flood hazards (A zones) by the publication of a community’s 
FHBM or FIRM, but has neither produced water surface elevation data nor identified a floodway 
or coastal high hazard area,” among other standards, the locality shall “[r]equire that all new 
subdivision proposals and other proposed developments . . . greater than 50 lots or 5 acres, 
whichever is lesser, include . . . base flood elevation data.”144 Therefore, subdivision ordinance 
modification may prove helpful as more and more communities pursue flood insurance from the 
NFIP for their residents in flood zones. 
 
                                                 
138 VA. CODE § 15.2-2240 (1997).  
139 VA. CODE § 15.2-2241(3) (2012). 
140 Id.  at § -2241(4). 
141 VA. CODE § 15.2-2242(8) (2014). 
142 Board of Supervisors of Augusta County v. Countryside Investment Co., 258 Va. 497, 504-05 (1999).  
143 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(a)-(f).  
144 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(b)(3).  
20 
 
5. Stormwater Management 
 
The Tool: Virginia’s regulatory stormwater management program addresses both water 
quality and water quantity.145 Minimizing the flow of stormwater can help reduce the impacts of 
recurrent flooding, and it is important that stormwater runoff be contained adequately to prevent 
flooding and that it flow into a conveyance system that can contain a sufficient volume of 
stormwater.146 A locality may fund its stormwater management program through its general 
fund147 or by offering small neighborhood grants to encourage grassroots solutions.148 
Additionally, “[a]ny locality, by ordinance, may establish a utility or enact a system of service 
charges to support a local stormwater management program consistent with Article 2.3 (§ 62.1-
44.15:24 et seq.).”149 Authorized uses of such stormwater fees include, among other uses, the 
acquisition of property necessary to construct, operate and maintain stormwater control facilities; 
the planning, design, engineering, construction, and debt retirement for new facilities; and the 
enlargement or improvement and operation and maintenance of existing facilities, including 
publicly or privately owned dams, levees, floodwalls, and pump stations used to control 
stormwater.150  
 
How to Use It: The imposition of a stormwater charge or fee for the uses specified in the 
authorizing statute could assist a locality in funding recurrent flooding due to sea level rise. Grants 
are also available from the state for interested localities under the Stormwater Local Assistance 
Fund (SLAF).151  Additionally, a locality has the ability to build stormwater management 
infrastructure, such as dams and levees.152 However, building infrastructure comes with 
installation and maintenance costs. Furthermore, the court’s ruling in Livingston v. VDOT indicates 
that a government agent can be held liable for flooding caused by its lack of maintenance of its 
infrastructure.153 A locality should perform careful hydrological analyses to ensure its stormwater 
infrastructure does not have negative externalities for nearby residents.   
 
6. Eminent Domain 
 
The Tool: As waters begin to rise, simply restricting development may not be enough.  
Localities can buy frequently flooding properties as they become available on the market, or may 
try to condemn them, which can be an expensive and politically disfavored approach. Virginia 
localities are presently empowered to acquire private properties for a variety of public purposes: 
                                                 
145 See 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-870-63 (2013) (discussing water quality design criteria); 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-
870-66 (2013) (discussing channel protection and flood protection).   
146 See 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-870-66 (2013). 
147 See, e.g., Drainage Systems, James City Cty. Va. , http://www.jamescitycountyva.gov/996/Drainage-Systems 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2017). 
148 See, e.g., http://www.jamescitycountyva.gov/853/Neighborhood-Rebates-Mini-Grants [need to bluebook] 
149 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2114 (2016). 
150 Id. 
151 See Virginia Department of Environmental Quality, 
http://www.deq.virginia.gov/Programs/Water/CleanWaterFinancingAssistance/StormwaterFundingPrograms/Storm
waterLocalAssistanceFund%28SLAF%29.aspx. 
152 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-970 (1997).  
153 726 S.E.2d 264, 277 (2012).  
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“[W]henever a locality is authorized to acquire real or personal property or property interests for 
a public use, it may do so by exercise of the power of eminent domain”.154 If the terms of purchase 
cannot be agreed upon, or for some reason negotiations are not possible, the governing body of 
any locality may use condemnation to acquire title to “(i) land, buildings and structures, (ii) any 
easement thereover or (iii) any sand, earth, gravel, water or other necessary material for the 
purpose of opening, constructing, repairing or maintaining a road or for any other authorized public 
undertaking”.155 In 2012, Virginia voters approved an eminent domain amendment to the state 
constitution that imposed limitations on the ability of the General Assembly to define “public use,” 
expanded the scope of “just compensation” to include both “lost access” and “lost profits,” 
prohibited takings beyond what is necessary, and imposed the burden of proof that the use is public 
on the condemnor.156  
 
Localities are “authorized” to acquire property for a public use pursuant to the procedures 
laid out in Title 25.1 of the Virginia Code.157 The phrases “is authorized” and “for a public use” in 
the condemnation statute set critical boundaries for the use of this tool.158 Localities should 
exercise caution when using this tool to ensure full compliance with their explicit statutory 
authority. Furthermore, Virginia courts rely heavily on the particular facts of each case to 
determine “public use.”159 Courts often will assume a use is public when the Assembly defines it 
as “public” in statute, but that language is not conclusive.160  
 
Some examples of when Virginia courts have allowed condemnation include: 1) when a 
city seized land for stormwater utility installation;161 2) when land was seized for a public service 
corporation to build a petroleum pipeline;162 and 3) when land was seized to build an electric line 
that will primarily supply one private entity, but is available for public transmission generally.163  
Conversely, some examples of when Virginia courts have not allowed condemnation include: 1) 
seizing a drainage easement to drain private land with ancillary public benefits;164 2) seizing land 
to develop a public harbor that can later be sold to a private entity without restriction;165 and 3) 
seizing a “slum” to provide the land to a developer.166  Once again, these cases are very fact-
specific, and should not be viewed as explicit authorizations for the actions of a locality.   
                                                 
154 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1901(A) (2013). 
155 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1901.1 (2003).  
156 VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; Francis A. Cherry, Jr., Aftermath of the “Property Rights” Amendment–Many Questions, 
Few Answer, Journal of Local Government Law 3 (Spring 2013), 
http://www.vsb.org/docs/sections/localgovernment/lg-2013-spring.pdf.   
157 See VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1 (2014).  
158 See VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; see, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (defining a public 
use as “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose”). 
159 See Hoffman Family, L.L.C. v. City of Alexandria, 634 S.E.2d 722, 729 (Va. 2006). 
160 See, e.g., id.; Infants v. Virginia Hous. Dev. Auth., 272 S.E.2d 649, 655 (Va. 1980); City of Richmond v. 
Dervishian, 57 S.E.2d 120, 123 (Va. 1950). 
161 See, e.g., Hoffman Family, L.L.C., 634 S.E.2d at 722.  
162 See, e.g., Peck Iron & Metal Co. v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 146 S.E.2d 169 (Va. Ct. App. 1966). 
163 See, e.g., Nichols v. Cent. Va. Power Co., 130 S.E. 764 (Va. 1925). 
164 See, e.g., Phillips v. Foster, 211 S.E.2d 93 (Va. 1975). 
165 See, e.g., Rudee Inlet Auth. v. Bastian, 147 S.E.2d 131 (Va. 1966). 




How to Use It: As a general policy consideration, condemnation should not be employed 
before other measures.  Unlike other legal tools, such as zoning, condemnation requires 
compensation of the property owner, so localities can pursue less drastic actions to address 
flooding that avoid these costs. Furthermore, the fact-specific nature of condemnation analysis in 
Virginia courts means there is inherent ambiguity to any condemnation. Additionally, the 
amendments approved in 2012 – specifically the inclusion of lost profits and lost access under just 
compensation, and the imposition of the burden of proof on the condemnor – will likely increase 
trial length and cost, as well as just compensation awards and settlements.167 The Virginia Supreme 
Court has clarified that these amendments do not expand existing property rights, but rather modify 
the takings power to 1) exclude benefits to “private gain, private benefit, private enterprise, 
increasing jobs, increasing tax revenue, or economic development, except for the elimination of a 
public nuisance existing on the property” as public purposes and 2) add lost profits, and lost access 
to what losses require “just compensation.”168 
 
B. Voluntary Options 
 
1. Development Rights 
 
The Tool: In a method related to zoning, a locality may establish, by ordinance, procedures 
for the transfer of development rights (TDR) within its jurisdiction “to conserve and promote the 
public health, safety, and general welfare”.169 These programs can even cross county lines,170 
trading the development rights to the benefit of both localities. TDRs serve as a market-based 
approach to address sea level rise and recurrent flooding by incentivizing property owners to sell 
in a vulnerable location in exchange for the right to develop somewhere else.171 In principle, a 
TDR program downzones one area and, in parallel, upzones another area.172 Localities provide 
developers the option to purchase the increased development rights in the upzone area, and uses 
these funds to offset the loss of property values in the downzone area.173 
 
Additionally, localities may purchase and receive property rights for the preservation of 
open space.174 Localities have many options for these property rights including “(i) unrestricted 
fee simple title to tracts; (ii) fee simple title to such land subject to reservation of rights to use such 
lands for farming or to reservation of timber rights thereon; or (iii) easements in gross or such other 
interests in real estate of not less than five years' duration”.175 Under the Virginia Code, localities 
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are empowered to “[p]urchase development rights that will be dedicated as easements for 
conservation, open space or other purposes pursuant to the Open-Space Land Act.”176 These 
development rights are defined by the level and quantity of development permitted by the zoning 
ordinance “expressed in terms of housing units per acre, floor area ratio or equivalent local 
measure.”177 The use of these lands must conform to the comprehensive plan of the area.178 
How to Use It: A TDR program can be designed in conjunction with coastal zoning 
changes to adapt to sea level rise. For example, a locality could begin to create a commercial 
district in an area projected to avoid most recurrent flooding. Property owners in areas subject to 
recurrent flooding could sell development rights to developers in the commercial  district, and 
those funds can be used to compensate coastal residents for various flood mitigation measures, 
such as leaving land undeveloped or maintaining a vegetative buffer zone. TDR programs are new 
to Virginia for sea level rise adaptation, but they have been employed in Virginia for other purposes 
before. Frederick County, for example, enacted a TDR ordinance in 2010 “to transfer residential 
density from eligible sending areas to eligible receiving areas and/or transferee through a voluntary 
process for permanently conserving agricultural and forestry uses of lands and preserving rural 
open spaces, and natural and scenic resources.”179   
 
The Office of Farmland Preservation (the “Office”), within the Virginia Department of 
Agriculture and Consumer Services, was created to help localities develop and operate purchase 
of development rights programs.180 In addition to developing model programs, the Office also can 
secure grant funding for these conservation programs.181 Generally, localities can use these funds 
to purchase the available development rights of a landowner, effectively paying them to keep the 
land undisturbed. Frederick County created a Conservation Easement Authority in 2005 to aid 
landowners in “protecting and preserving farm and forest land, open space, scenic vistas, historic 
sites, water resources and environmentally sensitive lands.”182 
 
The primary advantage of these development rights programs are that they skirt the costs 
of regulatory takings; these are voluntary options that economically compensate “downzoned” 
landowners, making it less likely that courts will consider such policies a taking. Furthermore, by 
using development rights programs to “upzone” areas outside of flood zones, a locality can 
improve its resilience, and create commercial districts that will survive the coming influx of water. 
This tool, however, is limited by a community’s willingness to be “upzoned.” If there is substantial 
resistance to denser zoning throughout a locality, it will be difficult to enact these types of 
programs.   
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2. Tax Incentives 
 
The Tool: Title 58.1, Subtitle III of the Code of Virginia defines the taxation powers of 
localities to issue, maintain, assess and/or modify property taxes, excise taxes, license fees, sales 
taxes, etc.183 For example, localities may, by ordinance, partially or fully exempt certified 
stormwater management developments and property,184 partially exempt real estate that has 
erosion control improvements,185 partially or fully exempt wetlands and riparian buffers subject to 
a perpetual easement permitting inundation by water,186 and fully exempt any living shoreline 
project approved by VMRC or the locality’s wetlands board.187 
  
How to Use It: A locality could utilize its authority to exempt real property from taxation 
as a means of encouraging private sector participation in actions that encourage adaptation to sea 
level rise and recurrent flooding. For example, localities could encourage the installation of living 
shoreline projects by enacting an ordinance to exempt such projects from local taxation. When 
considering any such tax exemptions, localities should conduct a cost benefit analysis to weigh 
lost tax revenue versus the increased resilience to sea level rise. 
 
C. Funding Options 
 
1. Service Districts, and Taxes and Assessment for Local Improvements 
 
The Tool: Localities may create service districts by ordinance “to provide additional, more 
complete or more timely services of government than are desired in the locality or localities as a 
whole.”188 Additionally, citizens can petition to create a service district,189 although citizens 
moving into the community over time may not understand the original purpose for establishing the 
district, which may cause resistance to the tax. The language relevant to sea level rise issues says 
that after an ordinance creating a service district has been adopted, governing bodies have the 
power to “construct, maintain, and operate such facilities and equipment as may be necessary or 
desirable to provide additional, more complete, or more timely governmental services within a 
service district, including but not limited to…dams, … beach and shoreline management and 
restoration,… dredging creeks and rivers to maintain existing uses,” and “other services, events, 
or activities that will enhance the public use and enjoyment of and the public safety, public 
convenience, and public well-being within a service district.”190  Localities have the authority “[t]o 
levy and collect an annual tax upon any property in such service district subject to local taxation 
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to pay . . . expenses and charges for providing the government services authorized [elsewhere in 
the statute].”191  
 
Additionally, Virginia Code § 15.2-2404 authorizes localities to impose taxes or 
assessments on specific property for local improvements – for example, sidewalks, waterlines, 
street improvements, flood control barriers, and underground utilities. Some of these 
authorizations, such as the one associated with flood control barriers, are limited to certain 
jurisdictions, including Hampton.192 Proceeding in this manner does not require the establishment 
of a district.  
 
How to Use It: In general, service districts are an effective means of creating community 
level solutions.  Since service districts allow a locality to levy a more localized tax to provide a 
particularized service in an area, localities may potentially harness this tool to customize solutions 
for coastal and flood-prone communities. For example, Virginia Beach established the Sandbridge 
Special Service District in 1994. The purpose of the district is to “provid[e] financing for the local 
share of any beach and shoreline management and restoration project for the construction, 
maintenance, replenishment and restoration of the beach and shoreline on the Atlantic Ocean 
within the service district.”193 The American Shore and Beach Preservation Association (ASBPA) 
named the Sandbridge Beach Restoration Project as one of the beast restored beaches for 2017.194 
 
To a lesser scale, if a locality were looking to construct or improve a specific type of local 
improvement it may wish to pursue funding through a special tax or assessment. The locality would 
need to determine if the type of local improvement fell within the language of the locality’s 
authority in state code. For example, a locality listed in Virginia Code § 15.2-2404(D) could 
construct a flood control barrier and impose a tax or assessment upon abutting property owners 
that received a direct benefit from the improvement.195   
 
2. Public-Private Partnerships 
 
The Tool: Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) shift the risk and initial capital costs of 
infrastructure construction to the private sector.196 Typically in a PPP, private developers, 
designers, and capital firms coordinate with a government to construct a public good, such as a 
highway, and maintain it for an agreed period of time. The private stakeholders balance this initial 
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cost and future maintenance responsibility with some predictable revenue stream to justify the 
investment. For example, a firm may pay to build a bridge in exchange for future tolls.197   
 
PPPs in Virginia are governed by two statutes. The first, the Public Private Transportation 
Act of 1995,198 enables the formation of PPPs for the purpose of building transportation 
infrastructure. The second, the Public-Private Education Facilities and Infrastructure Act of 
2002,199covers, effectively, any other project in the public interest. Both statutes allow 
governments and agencies, including local governments, to form these partnerships.  
 
How to Use It: When public revenue is unavailable or insufficient for necessary facility 
and infrastructure resilience projects, PPPs may provide an avenue for local governments to build 
what is needed without negatively impacting their bond ratings by incurring excessive amounts of 
debt.200  
 
3. Shoreline Resiliency Fund 
 
The Tool: In 2016, the General Assembly established the Virginia Shoreline Resiliency 
Fund (the “Fund”)201 to enable local governments to create low-interest loan programs that “help 
residents and businesses that are subject to recurrent flooding as confirmed by a locality-certified 
floodplain manager.”202 Other states have developed similar programs, but Virginia’s Fund is 
unique in that it provides loans to mitigate future predicted flood damage.203  
 
How to Use It: At this time, the General Assembly has not appropriated moneys toward 
the Fund. Therefore, a first step to utilizing this tool would be to ensure that such moneys are 
appropriated and available.   
 
III. ELEVATE, RELOCATE, OR RETREAT? 
 
 Ultimately, legal tools are a means to enact an array of policy options.  For example, zoning 
can be used to retreat from the coast, to prevent further development in vulnerable areas, or to 
reinforce the coasts, by generously upzoning an area while simultaneously requiring the 
construction of flood mitigation infrastructure.  Like all tools, the value of a legal tool is in its use.   
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In order to provide context to the legal mechanisms and powers discussed above, this 
section explores three different general policy initiatives for tackling coastal flooding at the local 
level: elevation, relocation, and retreat. Elevating infrastructure raises a number of potential legal 
and political issues, such as tort liability during and after the project, as well as the burden such a 
project places on the public coffers.204 It can be a very costly undertaking to raise roads and other 
public infrastructure, and as noted above, a locality may be susceptible to a takings claim if it fails 
to properly maintain infrastructure of which it has taken control.205 Relocating infrastructure may 
present fewer legal issues if all the work is being done on public lands, but as was seen in Cape 
Cod and discussed below, localities still have to deal with the backlash from local residents.206  
 
Abandoning public infrastructure that is repeatedly flooding may come with the most 
political and legal consequences. At a certain point it may become too costly for a locality to 
maintain infrastructure, but this does not mean the locality is no longer responsible legally and 
financially because, as the example of Seagull Drive below shows, residents will challenge the 
decision.207 A locality at that point could benefit from new statutory authority for resilience 
planning in order to reduce the number of complications that arise from their actions as sea level 
rise and recurrent flooding grow worse over time. 
 
To assess each of these policy options, VCPC researched three jurisdictions outside of 
Virginia that have also dealt with these issues. Miami Beach, Florida; Cape Cod, Massachusetts; 
and Nags Head, North Carolina provide the backdrop for three methods of handling public 
infrastructure in light of sea level rise. These methods include raising infrastructure, relocating 
infrastructure, or, at the most extreme end of the spectrum, abandoning infrastructure.  
 
A. Miami Beach, Florida – Elevating Infrastructure 
  
Miami’s situation is unique because it is the most economically vulnerable city to sea level 
rise in the world.208 Miami Beach is built on a barrier island off the coast of southeast Florida and 
heavy rain or storm surges have caused flooding throughout its history.209 Recently, however, rain-
induced flooding has increased as well as sunny day, or tide-induced flooding, which has led to 
severe property damage.210 Exacerbating this problem is the fact that Miami is built on top of 
porous limestone rock.211 As the sea level rises, it pushes water into the underground holes of the 
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limestone, which raises the water table.212 This prevents more rain from being absorbed into the 
ground, leaving it to sit on the surface, adding to the flooding issues.213 This also lessens the 
feasibility of a sea wall because it would have to be drilled past the limestone to be effective.214 
With the increase in flood events, the acceleration of sea level rise in this area,215 and salt-water 
intrusion216, city officials are starting to take action to combat the flooding moving forward. Miami 
Beach is investing up to $500 million in a project to elevate roads, install pumps, and raise sea 
walls around the city.217  
 
 Aside from the huge costs of undertaking a project to raise infrastructure, there are several 
legal issues that may pose some difficulties with sea level rise adaptations.218 One problem is that 
it can be hard to find a legal basis for requiring private property owners to elevate their land, and 
it would most likely have to be done on a parcel-by-parcel basis.219 Further complicating the issue 
is the possibility, depending on state law, that elevated parcels may be legally liable under nuisance 
law for the flooding of neighboring lands.220 Projects to elevate infrastructure can be very 
expensive221 to fund construction or to compensate landowners.222  Elevating infrastructure can 
also create environmental externalities such as deepening estuaries.223   
  
The other option, relevant to what is being done in Miami Beach, is to avoid private 
property and elevate public roads and infrastructure.224 Again, there may be legal challenges to 
this undertaking depending on state law.225 The liability for flooding may lie with a locality if the 
elevated road creates a new drainage pattern, which leads to the denial of beneficial use of land or 
increased flooding.226 For example, localities in Louisiana are joining in a class action lawsuit 
against the state claiming that a newly-built 19-mile-long concrete barrier between lanes on a 
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highway worsened the serious flooding in 2016 by acting like a dam.227 Another potential issue 
with raised roads is flood insurance, and the inability of business owners to make claims because 
they are below grade level once a road is raised.228 In one example, FEMA denied a claim for flood 
damages to a restaurant called Sardinia in Miami Beach after a pump failed because FEMA’s 
current policy classifies anything below street level as a basement, which is what many businesses 
now fall under with raised roads.229 This will remain a problem until FEMA’s policy changes, and 
Miami Beach is working with the agency to reassess that classification.230  
 
B. Cape Cod, Massachusetts – Relocating Infrastructure 
 
Cape Cod is facing problems from the erosion of their shorelines, and is resorting to a form 
of retreat to address their issues.231 At Herring Cove Beach, Cape Cod’s most popular life-guarded 
beach, the northern parking lot is falling apart as the beach washes away in front of it.232 The 
parking lot was built on top of the beach in the 1950s, and over the years an artificial dune was 
maintained in front of the parking lot by pushing windblown sand from the parking lot to the 
dune.233 Erosion problems, and damage from a storm in December of 2011, led to responsive 
actions being taken to address the beach’s issues.234 These started with public meetings about 
stakeholder interests and possible options for beach redesign projects.235 The solution decided 
upon was to demolish the current parking lot and build a new one 125 feet behind it to allow for 
shoreline restoration.236 The new parking lot location accounts for fifty years of projected sea level 
rise, and the artificial dune will be reshaped to match the natural topography of the beach while 
allowing tourists to continue enjoying watching the sun set or seeing the North Atlantic right 
whales that come to Cape Cod Bay.237 
 
While the changes should increase the longevity of the popular tourist spot, they did not 
come without dissent. For example, similar change have caused some of the beachgoers to worry 
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that moving the parking lot will negatively impact their experience at Herring Cove Beach.238 This 
is not dissimilar from other beaches around the Cape Cod National Seashore. In 2015, residents of 
Brewster opposed parking lot renovations at Breakwater Beach.239 Residents put together a petition 
opposing a plan to move the parking area back 120 feet and build an artificial sand dune.240 Even 
though there was enough support garnered to implement a moratorium and hold a town meeting 
to discuss the relocation plans, the residents ultimately failed in stopping the project.241 One of the 
main arguments against moving the parking lot is that it would be relocated to a park that was 
gifted to the town.242 However, town officials said that using the land as a parking lot falls within 
the public purpose intent of the gift because it provides access to the beach.243 
 
Other forms of managed retreat exist as well. There could be a buyback program that 
features government entities purchasing at-risk properties from private owners.244 It could also 
come in the form of government regulation through bans on new construction in vulnerable areas 
or on hard armoring of the coastline.245 However, actions like these are very difficult when private 
property is involved.246 The relocation projects around the Cape Cod National Seashore would 
surely face many more roadblocks than they already do if they were not occurring on public 
land.247 
 
C. Nags Head, North Carolina – Abandoning Infrastructure 
  
At the most extreme end of the sea level rise adaptation spectrum, the Town of Nags Head 
has resorted to the abandonment of infrastructure.248 On September 7, 2016, the Nags Head Board 
of Commissioners voted to close a portion of Seagull Drive.249 The road has been a headache for 
town residents and officials as rising sea levels and storms have repeatedly battered it.250 Now all 
that remains after thousands of dollars spent, a beach nourishment project, and other ineffectual 
adaptation techniques, is one solitary home on the beachfront road.251  
 
 In the end, it was too much of a burden for the town to maintain the road. All of the high-
end houses on the street were condemned and the town eventually had to settle with property 
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owners for over a million dollars.252 Any work the town did to maintain a drivable road only lasted 
until the next storm hit.253 Abandoning the road does not mean that people can no longer use the 
right-of-way, but the town no longer has the responsibility and financial burden of maintaining 
Seagull Drive.254  
 
Although the town may no longer have the expense of road repairs, issues with Seagull 
Drive have not completely disappeared. Some of the reasoning behind closing the road was to 
incentivize residents to work out easement deals with neighbors for access to their property.255 
While some residents have worked out easements, the town may have to become more involved 
in the process if the residents cannot all come to agreements.256 There are also public safety 
concerns. Residents are worried that closing the road will become a public safety issue because it 
will become more difficult for emergency vehicles to access the area.257 Another issue is that the 
last condemned house remaining may pose a danger with debris and its exposed septic tank.258 
That property was not part of the previous settlement with homeowners, and the town claims that 
the house falls under the jurisdiction of North Carolina because it now is on public trust land and 
in Town of Nags Head v. Cherry, Inc., the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that “[a]ny party, 
public or private, can assert title to land on the strength of a deed, but only the State, acting in its 
sovereign capacity, may assert rights in land by means of the public trust doctrine.”259 This may 
end up leading to more legal battles as property owners, Nags Head, and North Carolina decide 
who has to pay to remove the last vacant house on Seagull Drive.260 
 
IV. SEEKING A BIGGER TOOLBOX 
  
This section examines potential state actions that could support the ability of local 
governments to address the issues of sea level rise and recurrent flooding. The VCPC does not 
expressly advocate for any one of these initiatives; rather, each option is merely a concept that can 
be modified as necessary, or used to inspire new ideas.     
 
A. Statutory Clarifications 
 
One of the simplest actions the Commonwealth could take to pave the way for local action 
is to add new language to already existing statutes and policies in order to dispel any concerns 
about localities’ authority to act to address a future risk.  These small changes are important due 
to the limitations of the Dillon Rule.  If the Commonwealth is willing to allow a locality to use a 
certain power to address future flooding due to sea level rise, the legislature may simply add a 
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phrase such as: “for the purpose of managing, mitigating, and preventing probable future 
flooding.”    
 
This type of clarifying language could be useful in relation to local authorities related to 
land use planning and development. For example, expanding the language of Virginia Code § 15.2-
2223.3 beyond Hampton Roads to include all coastal localities, and providing parameters on how 
localities should consider VIMS’ coastal resource management guidance in their comprehensive 
plans as required by Virginia Code §§ 15.2-2223.2 and 28.2-1100(9), would be helpful. And, the 
language of Virginia Code §§15.2-2283 and -2284 could be expanded to incorporate specific 
authority for localities to incorporate future sea level rise and recurrent flooding as an explicit 
purpose and factor for zoning consideration.  The incorporation of such language may reduce 
locality concern as to whether enacting zoning for future projected flooding is “arbitrarily or 
capriciously depriv[ing] a person of the legitimate use of his or her property.”261  
 
Furthermore, clarification could be provided with respect to stormwater utility fees. 
Localities can currently establish a service charge as part of their stormwater management 
programs to fund the construction of infrastructure such as dams and levees;262 the Commonwealth 
could add “future predicted flooding” language to this statute to explicitly grant localities the 
authority to impose a utility fee or service charge to be used for the planning, design, construction, 
operation, and maintenance of infrastructure related to future sea level rise and recurrent flooding.  
 
B. Funding Options 
 
In addition to clear authority to act, localities also need funding options to assist with the 
implementation of adaptation measures. Some ways in which the Commonwealth could provide 
funding options to localities would be to: (1) appropriate moneys to the Virginia Shoreline 
Resiliency Fund,263 (2) establish express statutory language for localities to create a service 
district264 encompassing coastal properties subject to recurrent flooding which would provide a 
locality with funding for adaptation measures for that community, and (3) expand the language of 
the Public-Private Education Facilities and Infrastructure Act265 and Public Private Transportation 
Act266 to specifically authorize the establishment of public-private partnerships to fund the 
construction of public buildings and infrastructure that are resilient to future flooding risks. 
Additionally, existing funding tools such as those administered by the Virginia Resources 
Authority and Virginia Department of Environmental Quality could be evaluated for their 
applicability to adaptation measures. 
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Although there are potential limitations on a locality’s ability to plan for and address sea 
level rise and recurrent flooding, there are solutions for moving forward. Localities are not 
powerless to act in preparation for sea level rise.  In general, localities should emphasize voluntary 
incentive programs, such as a transfer of development rights program, which lessen the likelihood 
of an unconstitutional takings claim. Land use and development regulations, such as 
comprehensive planning, zoning, and subdivision ordinances, can each be harnessed, within 
respective limits, to establish a regulatory environment that guides the future of local land use.  
Localities may also lobby the General Assembly for explicit authorization to use some tools they 
arguably may already possess and to encourage state support for funding options.  By thus 
encouraging action at the local level, the Commonwealth could improve the flexibility of its 



















Appendix A: Virginia Court Treatment of the Dillon Rule 
 National Realty Corp. v. City of Virginia Beach, 209 Va. 172 (1968) 
o A realty corporation challenged the validity of examination fees for subdivision 
applications. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the fees were 
invalid because the Code of Virginia included no express grant of authority to 
localities to charge them.267 
 Commonwealth v. County Board of Arlington¸ 217 Va. 558 (1977) 
o The Virginia Supreme Court held that where a local government bases its 
authority on an implied power, the court should look to legislative intent and prior 
actions of the General Assembly to determine the scope of the locality’s authority. 
o Under the “reasonable selection of method” rule, once a court determines that an 
express or implied grant of authority exists, it defers to a locality’s reasonable 
selection of its method of executing that grant. 
o The Virginia Supreme Court held that the County exceeded its delegated power to 
supervise schools by entering into collective bargaining agreements with labor 
organizations.268  
 Wright v. Norfolk Electoral Board, 223 Va. 149 (1982) 
o The Supreme Court of Virginia prevented an election in Norfolk that would have 
determined property taxes in the locality by popular referendum. 
o The Court noted that local governments are limited by grants of power from the 
General Assembly, and those grants of power are in turn limited by the Virginia 
Constitution. Less specific language in the Constitution vesting power in the 
people must yield to more specific language limiting the authority of localities. 
 Cupp v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, 227 Va. 580 (1984) 
o Implied grants of power must be necessary to the execution of some explicit 
power. Implied powers must be narrowly construed. 
o Here, the defendant Board of Supervisors required a dedication of land through a 
conditional use permit issued by the government, based upon the right to grant 
special exemptions “under suitable regulations and safeguards.”269 The Supreme 
Court of Virginia found for the plaintiffs, decrying such an overbroad reading of 
the statute. 
 County Bd. of Arlington County v. Brown, 229 Va. 341 (1985) 
o The Virginia Supreme Court discussed “whether a county has the power to lease 
to a private developer publicly owned land currently used for public purposes.” 
The Court here reiterates that the powers of localities are limited by statute. 
o The County claimed to exercise a right to lease unused land, as provided by the 
Virginia Code, but the Court held that the land in question, while underdeveloped, 
did conform with the plain meaning of the term “unused”.270 
 Resource Conservation Mgmt., Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of Prince William, 238 Va. 
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o The court ruled the Virginia Waste Management Act did not preempt the 
locality’s authority to regulate landfills implied by the land use regulatory 
power.271  
o Similarly, localities are likely to maintain their authority to enact certain zoning 
and land use restrictions even if there are other state level provisions that would 
appear to preempt that authority.  
 City of Richmond v. Confrere Club of Richmond, 239 Va. 77 (1990) 
o The Court determined that a city ordinance that delegated authority to suspend 
bingo and raffle permits overstepped the authority granted by the Virginia Code, 
which requires that a local governing body, not an appointed official, conduct 
compliance hearings. 
o In this case, the court reinforced the principle of using legislative intent to 
evaluate a locality’s interpretation of a statute. If the General Assembly 
communicated a plain and unambiguous meaning in the legislation, localities 
should follow this plain meaning rather than looking to “extrinsic evidence or to 
the rules of construction” for an interpretation.272 
 Tidewater Ass'n of Homebuilders, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach,  241 Va. 114 (1991) 
o The Virginia Supreme Court upheld a fee implemented to pay for a water project 
in Virginia Beach that allowed the City to take water from Lake Gaston. 
o The Court emphasized a locality’s interest in preserving the health and welfare of 
its constituents, and made clear that the operation of a water system is a necessary 
means to promote that interest. 
o The Court argued that if a locality is authorized to take on a project, using 
financial levers to fund the project is an implied extension of that authority. 
Requiring the General Assembly to preemptively approve of every potential fund-
raising tool would be impractical. 
 Trible v. Bland, 250 Va. 20 (1995) 
o In this case, the locality approved a less restrictive residential zone that allowed 
for a group home. Plaintiff homeowner argued that a statute proscribing the 
locality’s authority to “zone out” group homes also proscribed that locality from 
downzoning to permit group homes in a residential zone. The Court determined 
that the locality did not exceed its authority because the statute did not limit more 
permissive zoning, only more restrictive zoning.273  
 City of Virginia Beach v. Hay, 258 Va. 217 (1999) 
o The Court decided whether a city attorney could take advantage of a personnel 
grievance procedure available only to “merit employees.” The attorney argued 
that the City had exceeded its authority in hiring him by appointment. The City’s 
Charter described how the City’s law department should be organized, but gave 
no express hiring authority. 
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o In this case, the Court determined that the locality’s method of exercising an 
implied authority would be upheld as long as it is reasonable.274 Where a power 
exists, any doubt of reasonableness is resolved in favor of the locality.275 This 
reverses the usual presumption against the locality when the existence of the 
implied authority is uncertain.276 
 Board of Supervisors of Augusta County v. Countryside Investment Co.¸ 258 Va. 497 
(1999) 
o When a locality adds specificity to a zoning ordinance, it can be invalidated if the 
new ordinance is more expansive than what is clearly granted in the enabling 
statute.  
o In this case, the Court invalidated a subdivision ordinance that established the lot 
size and floor space of parcels of land. The ordinance was not based on the 
enabling authority in Virginia Code section 15.2-2241 or 15.2-2242 and therefore 
was beyond the scope of the locality’s authority.277  
 Arlington County v. White, 259 Va. 708 (2000) 
o If a term is not clearly defined in the enabling statute, the locality must define that 
term “reasonably.”278  
o Here, the locality extended self-funded health insurance coverage to unmarried 
“domestic partners.” The Court determined this definition was an unreasonable 
expansion of the locality’s granted authority because it required only financial 
interdependence in place of dependence.279 
 Logie v. Town of Front Royal, 58 Va. Cir. 527 (2002) 
o In this case, the locality inspected residential rental properties, which was within 
its authority, and shut off power to properties that were in violation of the 
Uniform Statewide Property Maintenance Code.280  
o The court determined that the locality exceeded its enabling authority because it 
went beyond its authority to inspect properties by shutting off power, which was 
outside of the legislative intent.281  
 Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Robertson, 266 Va. 525 (2003) 
o In this case, the Court upheld a county zoning regulation that required a 200-foot 
setback based on projected noise and traffic impacts.282 The residential home 
builder seeking an exemption from this setback requirement argued that the 
county’s denial of his application was “arbitrary, capricious, and 
unreasonable.”283  
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o The Court disagreed, holding that the county presented sufficient evidence, 
including projected noise and traffic levels, making the denial of the application 
reasonable and within its authority.284 
 Eberth v. County of Prince William, 49 Va.App. 105 (2006) 
o This case invalidated an ordinance penalizing car owners who parked uninspected 
vehicles on public highways. The ordinance extended past the scope of authority 
granted by the General Assembly in the way it defined highways and because it 
attempted to regulate parking as opposed to operation of a vehicle. 
o This provides an example of a locality stepping beyond the capacity of its 
statutory authority. Prince William County defined a public highway by the 
number of lots or living units when the enabling statute allowed definition of 
public highways only by number of lots. 
o The court also found that “park” and “operate” in the context of vehicles had 
distinguishable meanings. The relevant section of the Virginia Code regulated 
operation of vehicles, and Prince William extended its reach beyond that to 
include parking as well. 
 Logan v. City Council of City of Roanoke, 275 Va. 483 (2008) 
o Plaintiff Logan challenged the validity of a subdivision by claiming that the 
locality had exceeded its powers under the Dillon Rule by delegating its 
application and enforcement authority over subdivisions. 
o The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the delegation. The Court affirms its 
commitment to strictly reading the text of express grants of authority, and its 
“[presumption] that every part of a statute has some effect. . . .”285 
 Board of Zoning Appeals of Fairfax County v. Board of Sup’rs of Fairfax County, 276 
Va. 550 (2008) 
o The Court found that the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) could not litigate on its 
own behalf because no state law expressly granted it that power. 
o This case discusses the “corollary” of the Dillon Rule, which applies the Dillon 
Rule to other public bodies, such as boards of supervisors and school boards.286 
The Court clarifies that “[t]he corollary to Dillon's Rule does not refer to sources 
from which a municipal corporation derives its power….” Regardless, the 
corollary to the Dillon Rule does apply the rule to Boards of Zoning Appeals.287 
 Marble Technologies v. City of Hampton, 279 Va. 409 (2010) 
o In this case, the city’s zoning ordinance used federal criteria to establish the 
parameters of the local areas protected under the Chesapeake Bay Preservation 
Act.288 The issue was whether the city was authorized to use this federal criterion 
under the state enabling authority when Sections 10.1-2200(A)(ii) and 10.1-2109 
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of the Code of Virginia required that localities use criteria established by the 
state.289 
o The Court concluded that the city “lacked express or implied authority to 
consider” federal criteria and therefore exceeded its authority under the act.290  
o Just as in City of Richmond v. Confrere Club of Richmond, the Court here held 
that when there is ambiguity over the limits of the local government’s authority, 
the Dillon Rule requires that the question be construed against the local 
government.291 This differs from the rule seen in Commonwealth v. County Board 
of Arlington, where any ambiguity in the method of implementation is construed 
in favor of the local government.  
 Schefer v. City Council of Falls Church, 279 Va. 588 (2010) 
o In this case the court upheld a city ordinance that regulated the height of one-
family dwellings. 
o In matters of zoning, localities have broad discretion under the Dillon Rule. 
Contrast this deference to the more skeptical review by courts of ambiguities in 
specific definitions and criteria in a statute.292 
o The party challenging the exercise of authority bears the burden of demonstrating 
that it is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.293 
 Sinclair v. New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC, 283 Va. 567 (2012) 
o In this case, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the broad zoning authority 
granted by §15.2-2280 of the Code of Virginia did not allow the Albemarle 
County Board of Supervisors to delegate its legislative function, the approval of 
critical slope waivers, to the planning commission.294 
o In reaching this decision, the Court noted that the General Assembly does 
sometimes grant localities the power to delegate legislative functions, but only in 
those instances where doing so is expressly provided by statute.295 
o The Court also noted that in the case of a conflict between a local ordinance and a 
state statute, the statute will always prevail.296 
 Town of Occoquan v. Elm Street Development, Inc., 82 Va. Cir. 53 (2010) 
o The Virginia Supreme Court held that the town of Occoquan exceeded its 
authority under the Dillon Rule when adopting a zoning ordinance that required a 
special use permit (SUP) for construction on critical slopes in residential areas.297  
o While the Town did have some authority under the Chesapeake Bay Preservation 
Act to exercise its police and zoning powers to protect water quality, the General 
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Assembly had specifically withheld that the authority to require SUPs in by-right 
residential development areas.298 
o A locality cannot implement more restrictive requirements than a previously 
enacted state statute. 
 Johnson v. Arlington County, 794 S.E.2d 389 (2016) 
o Two taxpayers challenged the locality’s decision regarding the consideration of 
Transfer of Development Rights (TDRs) in their real estate assessments. The 
County had certified their properties as sending zones, but in the years before it 
approved a receiving zone for the TDRs, it assessed the taxpayers’ properties at a 
much higher value because of them. 
o The Virginia Supreme Court, interpreting section 15.2–2316.2 of the Virginia 
Code, ruled that the County could not tax the TDRs until it passed a set of twelve 
TDR-related ordinances. The Court acknowledged that the word “shall” in some 
circumstances can be construed as permissive, not mandatory. The plain language 
of the statute in this case, however, indicated that the “shall” in § 15.2–2316.2 
was intended to be mandatory. 
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